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Principal aims of the studies are to: 
 Study I: identify markers of conscious visual perception that generalize 
across different stimuli and are reliable enough within one study. 
 Study II: test if the P300 component could rather mark a consequence of 
conscious visual perception related to working memory processes. 
 Study III: investigate whether pre-stimulus TMS masking of visual targets is 
also possible through stimulation of frontal areas of the brain and identify 
the neural markers of this effect. 
 Study IV: investigate the specific behavioral and neural effect of prior know-
ledge on conscious visual perception by concurrently controlling for the 
well-known effect of sensory evidence. 
 Study V: determine whether consciously perceived task-irrelevant back-
ground images can be distinguished on the basis of neural responses to TMS 
perturbation during prolonged perception. 
 Study VI: investigate whether it is possible to induce sleep slow waves (a 
well-known marker for the loss of consciousness during sleep) also from the 
early visual cortex if a long-interval paired pulse TMS regime is employed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The perceptual capacity of the brain is amazing. The most puzzling part of it is, 
however, that the objective neurobiological processes on which this capacity is 
founded are capable of creating a conscious experience of what we perceive. 
This ability is indeed so puzzling that a precise definition of consciousness is 
hard or even unreasonable to formulate at this point (Crick & Koch, 1990). In 
the most general sense “Consciousness consists of those states of sentience, or 
feeling, or awareness, which begin in the morning when we awake from a 
dreamless sleep and continue throughout the day until we fall into a coma or die 
or fall asleep again or otherwise become unconscious” (Searle, 1997). 
The present thesis is concerned with our immediate and subjective sensory 
experience that tends to accompany our interactions with the world and which 
could be described as the basic, “entry level” consciousness exemplified by the 
phenomena of sensation and perception (Block, 1995). Despite its seemingly 
straightforward immediate appearance, conscious perception has remained 
largely a mystery for fundamental sciences studying consciousness. The present 
work aspires to further our understanding of the neural basis of conscious 
perception by improving the experimental paradigms, by using more sensitive 
analysis methods and by considering other possible related phenomena such as 
concurrent mental states accompanying consciousness. The following overview 
is set to show how the present approach is related to the currently important 
directions in the field of scientific studies of consciousness and how the 
experimental and theoretical work carried out in the context of the present thesis 
contributes to them. 
Because vision is by far the most dominant of human (and also primate) 
senses most research on conscious perception has concentrated on the visual 
modality. This is also true for the work at hand. Therefore, most of the 
following discourse and the corresponding examples will be about conscious 
visual perception. One should nevertheless keep in mind that the phenomenon 
of consciousness does not only encompass our ability to see and the long-term 
goal of the study of consciousness is to unveil the neural basis of any kind of 
conscious experience.  
Besides the fundamental importance of this question it also is clinically 
relevant. Understanding how consciousness arises in the brain would help to 
better identify whether or not a patient is conscious, advance anesthetic proce-
dures and techniques or even treat disorders such as diseases and traumas 
accompanied by coma and vegetative state. 
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1. Toward the neural basis of consciousness 
1.1 The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) 
How to study the neural basis of a naturally occurring phenomenon if there is 
no objective way to observe this phenomenon directly? This is the biggest 
problem facing the neuroscience of consciousness today. As consciousness is, 
first and foremost hallmarked by a subjective quality of experience the only 
waterproof way to really know “from outside” if an event was consciously ex-
perienced or not is to ask the respective individual to report his/her introspective 
experience (Baars, 1988). Ideally, however, we would like to have objectively 
observable neural indicators of whether the event was indeed consciously per-
ceived. The most common strategy to study consciousness to date is therefore to 
compare the neural activity that accompanies the reported conscious experience 
of a well-defined event to neural activity when the same event was not con-
sciously experienced. The goal of such a contrastive approach is to find markers 
for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) – the “minimal set of neural 
events jointly sufficient for a specific conscious experience” (Koch, 2004). The 
hope is that once such objectively observable markers (i.e. macroscopic mea-
surements reflecting the critical neural events) are found one can proceed to 
studying the underlying NCC and ultimately the actual mechanism that are 
indexed by these NCC. 
 
1.2 The problem with the NCC 
The simple and elegant NCC concept outlined above has been fruitful in many 
ways. There are now several candidate markers of NCC that have been iden-
tified in a plethora of studies (e.g. Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010; see also Studies 
I and II for a more detailed discussion). Somewhat more worrisome is, how-
ever, that no consensus about the most important markers of NCC has yet 
emerged. Some studies have found that the markers of NCC occur relatively 
late and are related to large-scale activity in fronto-parietal networks (e.g. Del 
Cul et al., 2007). Others have found much earlier markers arising solely in the 
early visual cortex (e.g. Pins & ffytche, 2003), and recently, mid-lateny markers 
of NCC in occipito-tempotal networks have received the most attention 
(Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010). 
It has been proposed that one reason for the contradictory empirical results 
may be related to the method of identifying the markers of NCC – the contras-
tive analysis (Overgaard, 2004; Bachmann, 2009; Aru et al., 2012b; de Graaf et 
al., 2012). By contrasting the neural activity in conditions with conscious 
perception to conditions without conscious perception only those markers 
should be identified that are uniquely present or reliably more strongly present 
when conscious perception occurred. However, the markers of NCC may not 
constitute the only significant differences in this situation. Depending on the 
study at hand, neural prerequisites (NCC-pr) and neural consequences (NCC-
co) may also vary systematically between conditions with and without 
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consciousness. Consequently, by conducting a contrastive analysis these 
additional processes may be misclassified as NCC proper.  
For example, imagine a very boring and tedious experiment where the per-
ception of faint stimuli has to be rated (NB! This is a quite typical description of 
NCC experiments). Due to random fluctuations in attention some faint stimuli 
may benefit relatively more from the attentional enhancement than others thus 
leading to an increased probability that the former stimuli are perceived con-
sciously. Now, by conducting a contrastive analysis not only the NCC but also 
the neural correlates of attention will be present (or relatively more strongly 
present) in the condition with conscious perception. Consequently, they will 
also be reflected in the results of the contrastive analysis and get misclassified 
as NCC proper (Aru et al., 2012b; De Graaf et al., 2012). Note that although 
attention and consciousness are regarded as one and the same phenomenon by 
some researchers we do not share this view (for a relevant discussion see 
Bachmann, 2006, 2011; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 
2008; Aru & Bachmann, 2015). Strong arguments against the view that 
attention and consciousness are equivalent come from the experiments showing 
that selective attention disturbs target consciousness (Bachmann & Murd, 2010; 
Murd & Bachmann, 2011).  
Several theories of consciousness put a lot of emphasis on integration of 
neural activity taking place in mutually distant brain locations (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011; Tononi & Koch, 2008; Melloni & Singer, 2010). Thus, 
consciousness is thought by many to be a more global integration process – it is 
intimately related to a multitude of other processes participating in mental 
activity, whether conscious or unconscious. It is no wonder then that the 3 types 
of NCC (NCC-pr/NCC proper/NCC-co) have proven to be quite difficult to 
delineate in practice. 
 
1.3 Possible solutions to the NCC problem 
Although it has been realized for a while now that the contrastive method has its 
pitfalls when applied to the study of the markers of NCC (Overgaard, 2004; 
Bachmann, 2009; Aru et al., 2012b; de Graaf et al., 2012) no definite solution to 
the problem has yet emerged (Aru et al., 2015). Many studies have tried to 
delineate conscious perception from some other parallel process such as 
attention or working memory, but since it is never possible to argue that all 
NCC-pr/NCC-co have been accounted for it is also not possible to argue that the 
identified differences really are the markers of NCC proper.  
Due to this unfortunate methodological situation the NCC concept seems to 
have fallen out of favor lately. One can nevertheless argue that no better alter-
native to the NCC concept currently exists. Until we do not understand and pre-
cisely measure the brain and its processes better we can only use approxi-
mations of the mechanism of consciousness in the form of markers and 
correlates – be it properties of single neurons or larger networks. The idea is 
thus to use “the ability to predict as a surrogate for understanding” (Devor et al., 
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2013). In order to do that we must continue to look for more reliable neural 
activity markers that are exclusively present in conditions with conscious per-
ception compared to conditions without conscious perception (i.e. the markers 
of NCC). We must thus look for alternatives to the problematic contrastive 
approach, but also for ways to improve the contrastive approach itself. 
These goals have been realized in the present work by adopting the 
following rationales:  
 
Rationales: 
1)  More refined experimental paradigms are needed to control for or investigate 
possible NCC-pr/NCC-co. (Studies I, II, III, and IV) 
2)  The stimuli used in typical paradigms are too restrictive and artificial. This 
may distort or bias the results and pose an obstacle for revealing the general 
markers of consciousness invariant to the narrow range of stimulus contents. 
(Studies I, IV and V)  
3)  More attention should be given to the variability in results and how it can be 
explained. (Studies I, III and IV) 
4)  The ongoing state of the brain must be taken into account when investigating 
the neural markers of consciousness as a response to natural and artificial 
perturbations of the brain. (Studies III, V and VI) 
 
 
2. Reliability and stability of NCC 
As outlined in the previous chapter the contrastive method which is typically 
used to identify the markers of NCC has its pitfalls. If conditions with and with-
out conscious perception are contrasted NCC-pr and/or NCC-co may be mis-
classified as NCC proper. Note that these accompanying processes need not be 
the same in all studies, but may depend on the specifics of the applied paradigm 
and stimulus material (Aru et al., 2012b). For example, the N170 component 
may be a marker of NCC-pr or even NCC proper exclusively for faces (Navajas 
et al., 2013; see also Rationale 2). This makes the different NCC studies 
inherently difficult to compare since it is unclear to what extent their results 
should overlap or whether they should have a common denominator at all 
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). However, it has been the underlying assumption 
from the very beginning that “/.../ all the different aspects of consciousness /.../ 
employ a basic common mechanism or perhaps a few such mechanisms.” 
(Crick & Koch, 1990). Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that all the diffe-
rent NCC paradigms could in principle share a common marker. Again, the 
reason why so many paradigms do not share a common NCC marker may have 
to do with the contrastive fallacy.  
Namely, the contrastive analysis may not only be problematic between 
studies (misclassification of NCC-pr/NCC-co as NCC proper), but also within 
studies. The identified markers of NCC may not be reliable nor stable if only 
one specific paradigm is considered (see Introduction of Study I for a longer 
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description of this problem). It has been long recognized that evoked neural 
responses to a repeated stimulus exhibit large variability. Arieli at al. (1996) 
demonstrated that this variability in cortical evoked activity is related to the 
fluctuating initial state ante target stimulus. However, as the authors themselves 
note the prominent ongoing background activity continues to change while the 
deterministic evoked response unfolds. Thus, the signal is composed of non-
stationary ongoing activity and a possibly variable evoked response over trials. 
Of course it would be nice if we could assume that the conditions with and 
without conscious perception are both equally variable (i.e., effectively in-
variant) in terms of these two signal components within one study, but are they?  
Interestingly and related to this issue, a recent advance in the field has been 
accomplished by Schurger et al. (2015) who show that activity in the un-
conscious condition is more variable. Thus, the conscious condition is characte-
rized by more stability within and across trials (although see also Solovey et al., 
2015). In hindsight, a case may even be made for the claim that many if not all 
of the measures of conscious perception depend on higher stability in the “seen” 
condition (consider synchrony, for example; Melloni et al., 2007). But if 
stability really is a property of conscious perception then how does this property 
relate to more typical markers of NCC within one study?  
In case of event-related potentials (ERPs) it would mean that the ERP 
estimate of the unconscious condition is more variable than the ERP estimate of 
the conscious condition. It seems to the author of this thesis that too little 
attention is usually given to what is happening in the unconscious condition in 
the experiments that have adopted the contrastive analysis. When people think 
and talk about the markers of NCC usually they only consider what is hap-
pening in the conscious condition. But by using the contrastive analysis what is 
identified as the markers of NCC is actually a difference between two con-
ditions. If one condition is more variable than the other then this will also be 
reflected in the difference. These circumstances will definitely affect the time at 
which the difference starts to become reliable. In the worst case scenario they 
may even hide the markers of NCC from the contrastive analysis altogether. 
Thus, Study I was designed to investigate how much the markers of NCC 
vary when only the data from one experiment are considered. The goal was to 
test if it is possible to find reliable and stable estimates for NCC markers and 
their timing despite the pitfalls of the contrastive analysis. At this point we 
leave open the question of whether conscious perception emerges at once as a 
step function or gradually (Bachmann, 2000; 2013). In any case there is a 
moment or epoch of time when the initial change in the processes underlying 
the conscious percept takes place.  
First, we wanted to create a paradigm that would be more general in terms of 
stimulus content and thus more clean in terms of the contrastive analysis (see 
Rationales 1 and 2). We presented a heterogeneous stimulus set at threshold 
contrast to reduce the role of visual categorical restriction. This also eliminated 
the confound of stimulus predictability as it is known that the latency of NCC 
markers may shift as much as 100 ms when stimuli become predictable 
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(Melloni et al., 2011). By averaging over trials where many different stimuli 
were presented we obtained more general markers of conscious visual per-
ception (gmNCC) associated with seeing something at all (with narrow specifi-
city dissolved) as opposed to the markers of NCC obtained when seeing one 
specific thing or a small set belonging to a restricted category. We then 
concentrated on the variability of these gmNCC (see Rationale 3) by repeatedly 
sampling from the pool of all available trials and thus creating 100 different but 
objectively (in terms of stimulus content) completely identical subsets of trials. 
To be abundantly clear, these subsets were always identical for the conditions 
with and without conscious perception and also for each of the 100 different 
subsets altogether, but at the same time avoiding the narrow class and exemplar 
specificity of stimuli so characteristic to the prevailing majority of studies so 
far. We then performed a contrastive analysis on each of the 100 matched sub-
sets of trials with and without conscious perception separately. We recorded 
which ERP components differed between these two conditions and at what time 
the differences begun to arise.  
First of all, the results suggest two quite reliable gmNCC for this study. The 
most prominent marker was the P300. This component was significant regard-
less of which subset of the data was considered. Another marker was the N200. 
This component reliably differentiated between the conditions in 81% of the 
individual contrastive analyses. Both components are well known from previous 
literature and have consistently been associated with conscious visual per-
ception (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010). However, not all studies have found both 
markers. Because we observed that the markers of NCC (N200 in this case) can 
indeed be hidden from the results of a contrastive analysis depending on which 
subset of data is considered it is possible that other studies have missed some 
markers of NCC as well. Thus, due to the pitfalls of the contrastive method 
NCC markers are not always reliable even within one paradigm.  
We also analyzed the variability in the onset timing of gmNCC, i.e., the time 
at which significant differences started to occur. Onset latency varied a lot from 
one subset to another even if noise/possibly unrelated ongoing activity was 
removed from the single trials to improve the condition specific ERP estimates. 
The mean onset latency of P300 was observed 232 ms after visual stimulus 
onset, but this onset ranged from 151– 268 ms, i.e., varied almost over 100 ms 
depending on the included data. The mean onset latency of N200 was 208 ms, 
but it again varied over several tens of ms (191–232 ms). By analyzing single 
trial parameters (peak amplitude, peak latency, peak latency variance) during 
the range of observed onset latencies we show that it is first and foremost the 
fluctuating amplitude in the condition without conscious perception that 
determined when differences between conditions become evident – in other 
words, the not conscious condition substantially determines when the markers 
of NCC occur. These results thus demonstrate that stability may indeed differ 
between conditions and an increase in the stability of evoked responses may be 
a hallmark of conscious perception. 
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To summarize, in Study I we capitalized on a heterogeneous stimulus set 
and variability analysis to find out which markers of NCC are general across 
stimuli (Rationales 2) and reliable enough within one study despite the pitfalls 
of the contrastive method (Rationale 1). Results indicate that N200 and P300 
are the two ERP components that satisfy these criteria. However, the results 
also exemplify the extent of the contrastive fallacy by showing how unstable the 
resulting NCC markers can be (possibly due to increased instability in the un-
seen condition). This variability within a single study cannot be taken lightly or 
discarded as measurement imprecision because the validity of the resulting con-
clusions may heavily depend on it (Rationale 3). Future research should thus be 
more aware of possible pitfalls of the contrastive method and try to find 
appropriate ways to estimate their extent (for example, see Railo et al. (2015) 
for an original approach).  
 
 
3. Is P300 a NCC-co? 
Study I indicates that N200 and P300 are the two candidate markers of NCC 
that generalize across different stimuli and are reliable enough within one study. 
However, it does not conclusively answer the question whether these compo-
nents actually mark the NCC proper. Although we tried to avoid stimulus type 
specific NCC-pr/NCC-co that does not mean that there may not exist some 
general processes that almost always accompany the NCC proper. As already 
noted in Chapter 1.2 consciousness is often hypothesized to be intimately 
related to a multitude of other processes participating in mental activity. This 
makes it very difficult to tear the different subtypes of NCC markers apart in 
practice. Consequently, we also cannot exclude the possibility that one or even 
both of the identified gmNCC are actually not markers of NCC proper. 
Particularly the notion that P300 is a marker of NCC proper has been criti-
cized. Although it is the centerpiece of one of the best known theories of con-
sciousness (the global neuronal workspace theory; Dehaene et al., 2006; De-
haene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2014) this component is classically 
known as a marker of working memory processes (Polich, 2007; 2012; but see 
also O'Connell et al., 2012; Kelly & O'Connell, 2013; Verleger et al., 2005; 
2014). Indeed, recent research by Pitts et al. (2014a,b) and Shafto and Pitts 
(2015) has stirred up the debate about P300 by showing that it only occurs if the 
consciously perceived stimuli are also task-relevant (which was the case in 
Study I). Thus, it is possible that P300 rather reflects an update in working 
memory content insensitive to whether the target stimulus is conscious or un-
conscious. 
To arrive at a better understanding of the role of P300 we conducted Study 
II to specifically test if P300 could mark a consequence of conscious per-
ception, i.e., we tried to delineate it from the markers of NCC proper. Our 
reasoning was as follows. The typical perceptual tasks in consciousness 
research are quite demanding. Subjects often report that the stimuli are very 
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hard and ambiguous to perceive. Thus, trials with more or less clear perception 
might constitute relatively rare events. This is exactly the kind of situation that 
leads to the classic P300 response (Donchin, 1981), because it supposedly 
elicits an updating of the mental model or ‘‘schema’’ of the stimulus context in 
working memory (Polich, 2007; 2012). Furthermore, in most studies (e.g. Del 
Cul et al., 2007) several different stimuli are presented in a random order and 
subjects are required to perform some kind of discrimination task to objectively 
assess whether they really perceived the stimulus. This also poses additional 
load on working memory involvement. We designed Study II to avoid these 
possible confounds in order to test whether P300 still reflects conscious per-
ception (Rationale 1). 
In many ways the approach adopted in Study II was opposite to the ap-
proach of Study I, thus complementing it. First, we tried to make the perceptual 
events and stimuli in Study II completely predictable. Only one stimulus was 
presented on each target-present trial (exceptions were a few catch trials without 
a stimulus) and subjects were informed about this fact. Furthermore, the 
contrast of the target stimulus (a gray @ sign) was carefully adjusted to make 
sure that subjects would consciously perceive the target stimulus on the 
majority of trials (75%). No discrimination task was used. Subjects only had to 
report whether they perceived the stimulus or not. Finally, in an attempt to 
replicate the results of Pitts et al. (2014a,b) and Shafto and Pitts (2015) an 
additional counting task was introduced. Subjects had to count either the trials 
where the target stimulus was seen or the trials where the target stimulus re-
mained unseen. These tasks were administered in alternating experimental blocks. 
If P300 indeed rather reflects the consequences of NCC (e.g., working memory 
update possibly depending on task relevance) then one would expect a relatively 
more pronounced P300 in the condition without conscious perception – especially 
when the unseen trials are counted.  
Despite the above described theoretical considerations results did not con-
firm our expectations. P300 was relatively more pronounced for all seen con-
ditions. The counting task did not have any systematic effect on the P300 
amplitude as well. Thus, in Study II P300 must be considered as one seemingly 
reliable marker of NCC. Nevertheless, P300 was not the only NCC marker in 
this study. Another component – the N200 – also reliably distinguished between 
the conditions with and without conscious perception irrespective of the 
counting condition.  
While Study II did not succeed in disassociating P300 from the candidate 
markers of NCC proper it must be recognized that this may also have hinged on 
several limitations of the experimental paradigm. Most importantly, we may not 
have achieved a sufficient relief of working memory demands which could have 
caused the results. P300 may have also indexed some other NCC-co in the 
adopted paradigm which was not taken into account. However, although this 
experiment was conducted specifically to study the P300 the same conside-
rations also hold for the N200. Even if N200 peaked earlier than P300 this alone 
does not make it a more trustworthy candidate marker of NCC proper. For 
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example, N200 may be associated with attentional processes and not the NCC 
proper.  
The above described results and discussion make it clear how hard it is to 
delineate the NCC-co from the NCC proper in practice. Obviously, further 
studies and more intricate paradigms are needed to test the role of P300 as well 
as N200 (Rationale 1). But keeping in mind that many studies have been 
conducted already that find very similar results (see Study I, for example) it 
may also turn out that both N200 and P300 are indeed markers of NCC proper 
and that they generalize over different stimuli and recording conditions (pro-
vided that the contrastive fallacy has been avoided). There persists a silent 
understanding in the field that only one ERP component can constitute a marker 
of NCC proper, but this must not necessarily be the case. According to the 
microgenetic description (Bachmann, 2000), conscious perception may evolve 
over different stages. The initial sensory aspect of perception may be es-
tablished in an earlier fast stage. A more working memory based experience of 
stimuli may arise at a somewhat slower stage. Similar notions have also been 
proposed by several other researchers (e.g. Navajas et al., 2014). 
 
 
4. Possible network effects on NCC 
In Study II we investigated possible NCC-co. But in order to get closer to the 
markers of NCC proper we also have to understand which processes are leading 
up to conscious perception as its prerequisites. As noted in Chapter 2, ongoing 
activity as a consequence of unperturbed spontaneous brain processes is often 
times as prominent as are evoked responses (Arieli at al., 1996). But is this 
ongoing activity also functionally relevant for upcoming stimulus processing? 
This seems to be in fact the case. Pre-stimulus activity – and in particular alpha 
oscillations in occipito-parietal cortices – can codetermine subsequent visual 
perception. For example, lower pre-stimulus alpha power is associated with 
increased performance on a difficult visual discrimination task (van Dijk et al., 
2008). Equivalent results have also been reported for phosphene perceptions as 
a result of primary visual cortex (V1) perturbations by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) (e.g. Romei et al., 2008). Currently it is a widely accepted 
view that initial information processing is in part dependent on the local pre-
stimulus state of early sensory areas. 
However, not only the local states of early sensory-perceptual encoding sites 
contribute to the processing of stimuli. For example, in visual masking of the 
target stimuli non-specific reticulo-thalamo-cortical modulation has long been 
argued to be critical for or at least instrumental in modifying conscious per-
ception (Bachmann, 1994). Indeed, recent research demonstrates that more 
global network states may be just as important for upcoming stimulus pro-
cessing as is local activity in sensory cortices (Weisz et al., 2014; Leonardelli et 
al., 2015; Sadaghiani et al., 2015; Godwin et al., 2015; Nierhaus et al., 2015). 
Thus, it is also important to understand these ongoing more general processes 
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and the state of functionally relevant networks because they may constitute 
critical NCC-pr (see Rationales 1 and 4). Importantly, many of these systems 
may work in a similar way irrespective of the specific stimulus contents. 
Pre-stimulus masking with TMS offers a perfect setting to study the above 
described network phenomena. Similar to paracontrast masking, pre-stimulus 
masking with TMS is achieved by introducing a disruptive signal prior to the 
onset of a visual target stimulus (e.g. Corthout et al. 1999a,b). Unlike modal 
masking, however, the disruption comes from the precisely timed TMS pulse 
and the processes induced by TMS are unspecific to the content of modal stimu-
lation. Thus, it is possible to target the underlying processes more specifically in 
time and space at the same time leaving content related specificity of processing 
exclusively to the modal target signals. 
Previous successful pre-stimulus masking studies have directed the TMS 
pulse to the early visual cortex (e.g. de Graaf et al., 2011a,b; Jacobs et al., 2012, 
2014; but see also Grosbras & Paus, 2003). Although non-specific by itself, this 
perturbation is directed right at the early functional areas specialized for visual 
contentful processing of the modal target stimuli and for which the importance 
of local pre-stimulus states has been demonstrated (see above). However, if 
general network states are as relevant as local activity in the early visual cortex 
then it should be possible to achieve a similar masking effect when TMS is 
targeted to other, non-visual areas located far from the visual modal cortex. To 
test this possibility Study III was carried out. 
In this study participants solved a simple visual discrimination task. A brief 
light gray Landolt square was presented on each trial. First, subjects had to 
report on which side of the square the gap was located (objective task) and 
second, how well they perceived the gap on a 4 point scale ranging from not at 
all to clearly visible (subjective task). Importantly, in this study TMS or SHAM 
stimulation (tilted coil) was not targeted at the early visual cortex but at the 
right frontal cortex and a single pulse was given either 140 or 60 ms before 
stimulus onset or 20 ms after. Based on previous literature we expected to see 
the masking effect specifically in the -60 ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) 
condition (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2012). 
Results show that TMS to the frontal cortex indeed disrupted perception 
specifically in the -60 ms SOA condition with real TMS. This effect was most 
clear for the objective discrimination performance. Similar, albeit a much 
weaker effect was also evident for the subjective visibility rating. However, for 
both measures the presence and extent of the masking effect was highly variable 
over subjects. Some subjects exhibited a big drop in performance while others 
did not exhibit it at all. In order to study the neural correlates of the frontal 
masking effect we took advantage of this variability to look for connections 
between behavioral outcomes and brain responses (Rationale 3).  
We identified the peak latencies of two TMS-evoked components (N100 and 
P270) and one visually evoked component (N200) from the ERPs of each 
subject separately and investigated whether they can account for how much 
individual performance dropped in the -60 ms SOA condition with real TMS 
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compared to SHAM stimulation. Because the study was initially conceived for 
the investigation of NCC-pr we were expecting to find very early effects – 
perhaps related to the TMS-evoked N100 component. The actual results were 
more surprising, however. By far the biggest portion of variability in objective 
discrimination results was explained by individual peak latencies of the late 
TMS-evoked P270 component (up to 45%). In contrast, peak latencies of the 
TMS-evoked N100 component did not explain any additional variability. 
Although not significant – peak latencies of the visually evoked N200 com-
ponent did also seem to account for a little bit of variability in objective 
discrimination results over and above the P270 component. This is interesting 
because these two components indeed overlap specifically in the critical -60 ms 
SOA condition. However, mean amplitude of N200 did not seem to be 
modulated by this overlap. Mean amplitude of N200 was only modulated by 
subjective visibility ratings. On the other hand, none of the subject-specific peak 
latencies could explain the extent of individual changes in subjective visibility 
ratings in response to TMS at -60 ms SOA.  
The strong correlation between the late TMS-evoked P270 component and 
the behavioral drop in objective discrimination performance indicates that the 
masking effect was not caused exclusively by a disruption of early visual 
processing that would clearly constitute a NCC-pr. Rather it seems that the 
unfolding neural response to TMS interacts critically with task-related pro-
cessing around 200 ms after visual stimulus onset. Because the N200 com-
ponent itself remained unaffected by TMS it is likely that the masking effect 
was not caused by disruption of the kind of visual processing marked by N200 
at all. Instead the interference seems to have occurred with processes temporally 
coinciding with the visual N200, but not reflected in N200 itself. This conclu-
sion is also strengthened by the fact that subjective visibility ratings did not 
decrease to the same extent as objective discrimination performance and no 
relationship between the subjective visibility ratings and the P270 component 
was found. Thus, one possible interpretation is that late TMS-evoked activity 
interfered with the use of perceptual information at higher cognitive levels (e.g. 
decision processes) or with the broadcasting of said perceptual information. 
Note that this interpretation is nevertheless compatible with the above proposed 
role of more global network states for conscious perception. 
But how do the above described results contribute to our understanding of 
the NCC which is the main topic of the present theses? Several aspects confirm 
the importance of N200 as a marker of conscious visual perception (see also 
Studies I and II). First, N200 amplitude was higher when subjects experienced 
the target stimulus more clearly. Second, the objective masking effect was 
strongest when a late TMS component overlapped with the N200. However, the 
second result also poses several problems. For example, it is unclear whether 
NCC-pr/NCC proper/NCC-co were affected or whether this effect is related to 
the NCC at all. Because the effect was specific for objective discrimination 
performance it may constitute an instance of dissociation between objective task 
performance and subjective conscious perception (see also Rounis et al., 2010). 
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Thus, the employed paradigm could prove to be very useful for delineating the 
3 types of NCC in the future (see also Rationale 1). After all, the N200 may 
index many other parallel processes in addition to the NCC as well and there-
fore – despite the conspicuous alignment of P270 and N200 – it is still unclear 
which process was affected exactly. Taken together, the results of Study III 
may illustrate how NCC can in principle overlap in time with NCC-pr, NCC-co 
or even with task-relevant processes that are unrelated to any of the 3 types of 
NCC (Aru et al. 2015; see also Bachmann (2015) on the uncertainties of 
studying brain-imaging markers of consciousness). 
In any case, following Rationale 3 we demonstrate that it is possible to 
exploit the variability in both behavior and neural responses to better study the 
critical processes underlying conscious visual perception. This is a step forward 
from the traditional ways of contrastive analysis. Also, following Rationale 4 
we show that it is important to understand what is going on in a larger network 
of task-related areas concurrently with the NCC in order to move toward a more 
precise and informed description of the NCC and the markers thereof.  
 
 
5. Predictions and the NCC 
As already mentioned above (see Chapter 2), predictions about upcoming 
stimuli have a systematic effect on subsequent neural responses. Furthermore, 
neural responses will be at least in part different depending on the stimulus 
material. Study I was designed to overcome these confounding factors, but now 
we turn to these topics in more detail in order to study their influence on 
conscious perception and on the related neural processes directly. 
The information from the retina is ambiguous and noisy. Thus, according to 
the currently prevalent belief it is necessary to complement sensory information 
by internally driven interpretational processes including filtering, generali-
zations, abstract categorization and decision processes all contributing to the 
function of uncertainty reduction of the information processing system in the 
brain. The influence of such top-down modulatory processes may already be 
visible at very early levels of information processing. For example, at the level 
of the lateral geniculate nucleus neuronal activity is not only influenced by 
retinal input but also by figure-ground modulation (Jones et al., 2015). The most 
prominent theoretical description explaining the role of such top-down pro-
cesses is certainly the predictive coding framework (Rao & Ballard, 1999; 
Friston, 2005). This framework encompasses a quite fundamental theory about 
how the brain works. It posits that perception – similar to Bayesian statistics – is 
a function of both sensory evidence and priors (Kersten et al., 2004). Although 
historically these ideas are quite old owing credit to von Helmholtz (1867) and 
cognitive scientists in the 1950ies and 60ies (e.g., Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 
1960; Norman, 1968; Neisser, 1967; Gregory, 1970), only currently the brain 
mechanisms implementing this top-down strategical mode of processing have 
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become accessible for scientific exploration. Moreover, these ideas have come 
to be related to the agenda of NCC research only recently (see Hohwy, 2013). 
Taken together, the general idea of the predictive coding framework is that 
stimulus driven activity is insufficient. It does not by itself form a stable and 
cognitively veridical neural representation (see also Chapter 2 for the proposed 
importance of stability in conscious perception). Prior knowledge about the 
world can be used to facilitate and complement this process. Thus, it is also an 
important aspect in relation to the NCC. In particular, this stance should help us 
better understand the processes leading up to conscious perception. For 
example, it is possible that NCC will differ for stimuli that we have prior know-
ledge about and/or that we expect compared to stimuli that are unexpected or 
even completely new. 
In any case, the effect of prior knowledge should be best observable with 
natural stimuli because the brain has the most prior knowledge about (or 
training with) this kind of information and neural networks should be optimally 
adapted to it (Kersten et al., 2004; see also Rationale 2). Millions of years have 
molded the brain under the environmental pressure featuring natural scenes and 
stimuli but simple artificial stimuli have a relatively short history and could not 
so dramatically have an impact on brain evolution. Note, however, that prior 
knowledge can manifest itself at many levels. It is quite impossible to present 
stimuli that do not relate to our knowledge about the world in any way. The 
most basic knowledge (e.g., typical statistics of the visual appearance of the en-
vironment, light from above, neighboring co-existence of light and shadow, 
texture invariants, etc.) is probably already built into the structure and the 
resulting processing algorithms of neural networks due to constant exposure 
(e.g. Berkes et al., 2011). Importantly, prior knowledge can also act on a faster 
time scale – perhaps through top-down modulations (e.g. Jones et al., 2015). 
The two following works are targeted at each of these levels.  
 
5.1 Facilitation through familiarization 
Previous studies have shown that prior knowledge about the upcoming stimuli 
can facilitate conscious perception (e.g. Aru et al., 2012a; Melloni et al, 2011; 
Mayer et al, in press). Yet it is not clear when after stimulus onset the effect of 
prior knowledge takes hold. If the above described theory of predictive coding 
holds true then prior knowledge may behave similarly to sensory evidence (see 
Melloni et al, 2011) and as a corollary, its effect on the processing of sensory 
evidence should take place already early in the processing hierarchy (Mayer et 
al, in press).  
To study the effect of prior knowledge specifically on conscious visual 
perception and separate it from the pure effect of sensory evidence Study IV 
was conducted (see Rationale 1). We used a large set of photographs depicting 
people in natural settings (see Rationale 2). Random Gaussian noise was also 
added to the photographs to bring them close to the perceptual threshold. On 
every trial subjects had to indicate whether the person in the picture was male or 
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female (objective answer) and whether they perceived a person at all in the 
picture (subjective answer). Importantly, perception of the stimuli could be 
facilitated in two orthogonal ways. A stimulus could either contain less noise 
(i.e. more sensory evidence) or could have been seen in a previous familiari-
zation phase (i.e. associated with prior knowledge). Both of these ways had an 
independent additive effect on the behavioral measures. While the subjects were 
solving the task their neural activity was measured via magnetoencephalo-
graphy (MEG).  
One way to investigate the neural markers of both facilitatory effects (in-
creased sensory evidence and prior knowledge) is to conduct an analysis of 
variance for the effects of the corresponding factors on neural response strength. 
Note that this analysis is equivalent to contrastive analysis. The results of such 
an analysis indicated that the main effect of prior knowledge starts in the P300 
range (from ca. 335 ms onward). The main effect of sensory evidence also 
covered the P300 range, but there was also an additional early effect (180–195 
ms post stimulus). Similar to the behavioral results no interaction between the 
two factors was evident. From this pattern of results one could conclude that 
only sensory evidence has an earlier effect on neural response strength, but the 
effect of prior knowledge is post-perceptual. Thus, it would seem that contrary 
to the predictive coding framework prior knowledge does not contribute to 
perception directly at its earlier stage but through later memory related pro-
cesses, for example (but see also Bachmann (2000) for a conciliation of the two 
stages). 
However, the above described contrastive analysis need not link perception 
directly to the neural measures because the results of this contrast may also 
reflect other cognitive process in addition to the perceptual processes of interest 
(Aru et al., 2012b; see also Chapter 1.2). Thus, to investigate when prior know-
ledge exerts its positive influence on conscious perception a more sensitive 
analysis is needed to test our hypothesis. According to Rationale 3 we again 
made use of the inter-individual variability in both neural and behavioral 
responses which should be related in meaningful and informative ways. The 
subject-specific difference in neural response strength between the conditions 
with and without prior knowledge was correlated with the same subject-specific 
difference but for the proportion of “seen” responses in both conditions (sub-
jective answer). This correlation analysis indicated a strong negative relation-
ship between the two measures at 80–95 ms after stimulus onset. This means 
that the bigger the gain in subjective perception was in the condition with prior 
knowledge the weaker neural responses tended to be in this early time window. 
The neural sources of this effect were localized to the early visual and parietal 
cortices. This effect was specific to subjective perception and prior knowledge – 
no similar correlation was found neither with changes in behavioral accuracy 
(objective answer) nor between changes in neural activity due to increased 
sensory evidence and the corresponding changes in subjective perception. Thus, 
the pattern of results hints at the possibility that objective performance may rely 
on different neural mechanisms compared to the subjective aspect of perception 
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(see also Study 3). Similarly, sensory evidence and prior knowledge may be 
coded in distinct ways (see also Aru et al., 2012a). 
These results are among the first to demonstrate that priors can indeed have a 
very early and direct effect on conscious visual perception, but they also have 
important implications for the NCC. First of all, they demonstrate that NCC 
studies should not only take into account and equalize for sensory evidence, 
because previous interactions with stimuli (e.g. stimuli from previous trials) 
may also be reflected in the neural responses of interest (Rationale 1). Im-
portantly, these two effects are probably distinctly different from each other. 
Sensory evidence can only affect the response evoked by it. Prior knowledge, 
however, will probably have to be reflected in the already ongoing activity of 
perceptual networks to have an early effect on evoked responses (Mayer et al, in 
press; see also Rationale 4).  
Because the results do not indicate any changes in the typical NCC time 
range (starting from ca. 200 ms) the effect of prior knowledge can be said to be 
an NCC-pr. However, notice that it really seems to be a specific and direct 
effect on subjective perception. Thus, it may not be a more general early 
process, but only related to the mechanisms responsible for the specific contents 
of conscious perception. This again makes clear how important it is to 
understand the NCC-pr/NCC-co in addition to distilling the NCC proper 
(Rationale 1). Further work must clarify how this early effect changes 
subsequent information processing and possibly the NCC proper (see Melloni et 
al., 2011, for example).  
 
5.2 Optimal stimuli for conscious perception 
In Study III (and to some extent even in Study IV) we already examined the 
role of ongoing activity and how it can influence subsequent stimulus pro-
cessing. However, in both studies ongoing activity was treated as “empty”, i.e. 
deprived of any specific stimulus content. Thus, these studies (as well as most 
of the other NCC studies) investigated the process of becoming conscious of 
some suddenly appearing visual content. In most natural situations, on the other 
hand, we remain conscious of our slowly changing environment for a while. It 
is reasonable to assume that the processes associated with maintaining a con-
scious perceptual state are at least to some extent different from the processes of 
creating the conscious percept anew. However, the former processes have been 
studied hardly at all (Rationale 4).  
The process of maintaining a conscious perceptual state is particularly 
interesting in relation to the predictive coding framework. As already mentioned 
above, the most basic properties with predictive value are probably already 
coded into the connectivity patterns of the relevant neural networks. For 
example, Berkes et al. (2011) found that during maturation ongoing activity in 
V1 of ferrets becomes increasingly more similar to evoked activity, but only in 
relation to natural stimuli (i.e. movie scenes) and not artificial stimuli (e.g. 
drifting sinusoidal gratings). Thus, it seems that these neural networks have 
23 
developed to specifically accommodate a certain kind of input (the natural 
environment) and this is the reason why their default state becomes most similar 
to this particular evoked state. Consequently, it is possible that the visual cortex 
does not respond similarly or even equally well to all kinds of stimuli. Some 
stimuli may be more optimal and therefore may elicit a richer and/or more 
vigorous neural response state (see also Rationale 2). If, for example, the visual 
system is currently exposed to a natural movie scene its processing capacity 
(according to the predictive coding framework) will be much more engaged 
compared to looking at an empty static screen. This reasoning lead us to ask 
whether it is possible to detect those differences in the neural activity reflecting 
ongoing perception without any task demands in dealing with stimulation 
included in this perceptual environment. 
We conducted Study V to test whether perturbing the visual cortex with 
TMS leads to different TMS-evoked brain responses depending on which kind 
of information the visual system currently holds and constantly updates. A no-
report paradigm was employed. Participants solved a simple visual task in the 
center of the screen while the critical task-irrelevant background image was 
changed after each 30 second long trial. While the subjects were continuously 
looking at the screen we perturbed the brain (TMS targeted to V1) and recorded 
the resulting neural responses via electroencephalography (EEG). Importantly, 
the task-irrelevant backgrounds were either very simple stimuli (e.g., sinusoidal 
gratings with high or low spatial-frequency content, plain dark or light areas) or 
photographs of realistic environments displaying either nature scenes or man-
made habitats.  
An analysis of TMS-evoked EEG potentials showed that differences in mean 
amplitude of the potentials emerged as a result of the different contents of the 
task-irrelevant visual background constantly present in the fringe consciousness. 
Interestingly, the clearest differences in mean amplitude were evident between 
different subclasses of realistic photographs. Photographs of nature scenes 
elicited relatively more negative TMS-evoked responses compared to photo-
graphs depicting man-made habitats and these differences were already evident 
early in the N100 time range. Comparably clear differences were not present for 
any of the other comparisons between background classes or subcategories 
representing differences in the low level attributes of the visual background 
such as brightness or spatial frequency.  
The results of Study V demonstrate that neural responses to brain pertur-
bation by TMS depend on the concurrent state of the visual system, i.e. the 
information it currently holds (Rationale 4). The results also indicate that 
response dynamics are most discriminable for different subcategories of 
realistic stimuli (Rationale 2). It is thus possible that because the visual system 
is best adapted to the processing of realistic stimuli these kinds of stimuli also 
elicit a richer and/or more vigorous neural response state. It is in no way clear 
yet how the processes associated with ongoing perceptual states relate to the 
much more intensively studied evoked responses to transient stimuli. If the goal 
is to find the NCC, however, it may be worth considering if only concentrating 
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on the more easily controllable paradigms with transient stimuli may hinder our 
progress. For example, if similar paradigms to the one described above could be 
successfully used for decoding the contents of conscious perception this would 
make a strong case for the possibility that the markers of NCC may be more 
readily observable during ongoing perception when the involved neural 
networks have settled into a robust sustainable state. An interesting question 
would then also be whether such sustained NCC markers share a common 
process binding the particular contents to conscious perception or whether the 
NCC proper are unique for each percept (see Study I for general markers of 
conscious visual perception). These speculative ideas can only be answered by 
future research adhering to Rationales 2 and 4. Last but not least, our new 
method of perturbing the brain by TMS combined with ERP measurement 
dependent on the specifics of visual stimulation could be developed as an 
approach for decoding of mental contents by brain imaging. 
 
 
6. States of consciousness 
So far the discussion has concentrated exclusively on neural correlates as-
sociated with contents of conscious perception. Studies I – IV were aimed at 
investigating the process of becoming conscious of some content and the 
associated markers of NCC. Study V sought to broaden the field of NCC 
research by investigating and decoding the contents of ongoing conscious 
perceptual states. However, in the more common sense the expression “states of 
consciousness” is used for describing phenomena such as wakefulness, sleep, 
anesthesia or coma. Thus, states of consciousness do not distinguish between 
specific contents, but whether any contents are possible at all and to what 
extent.  
Although the states and contents of consciousness have been studied in 
relatively isolated research efforts in the past, recently it has been acknowledged 
that both lines of evidence have to fit together in meaningful ways. Most im-
portantly, an acceptable measure of consciousness should be able to distinguish 
both the states and the contents of consciousness (Schurger et al., 2015). Such a 
measure should make sure whether – and if yes, how – content-representing and 
state-controlling mechanisms interact in producing conscious experiences and 
the corresponding NCC (Bachmann, 1994; Hohwy, 2013; Bachmann & Hudetz, 
2014; see also Rationale 4). 
Sleep – and in particular non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep – consti-
tutes a convenient state of unconsciousness for a comparison to wakefulness 
because it occurs naturally and thus does not require any invasive or artificial 
intervention. Although we probably are not completely unconscious during 
NREM sleep (e.g. Noreika et al., 2009; Siclari et al., 2013), a comparison to the 
fully awake state should nevertheless be good enough to bring out the 
differences between conscious and unconscious neural processes. For example, 
slow waves have been established as a rough indicator for the loss of con-
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sciousness because they only occur during NREM sleep and not during wake-
fulness (Amzica & Steriade, 1995; Massimini et al., 2004). Importantly, it is 
possible to probe the state of consciousness with slow waves as a proximal 
indicator because slow waves can also be induced during sleep with TMS 
(Massimini et al., 2007).  
Previous studies have not been able to successfully induce slow waves 
through occipital stimulation with a single strong TMS pulse (Massimini et al., 
2007). This is perhaps because spontaneously occurring slow waves are not 
very prominent in visual and sensory areas (Murphy et al., 2009). Another 
reason could be that the early visual cortex requires a different kind of 
stimulation to induce the neural dynamics underlying slow waves. Emanating 
from our knowledge on visual masking (Bachmann, 1994, 2000; but see also 
Study III) we wanted to test (i) whether two neural responses elicited by two 
TMS pulses separated by 100 ms interact similarly to how two modal visual 
stimuli interact in masking and (ii) whether it is possible after all to induce slow 
wave responses if V1 is stimulated with two TMS pulses separated by this time 
interval (long-interval paired pulse stimulation). If effective, it would enable us 
to compare the differences between states of consciousness to the differences 
found in our previous typical contents of consciousness studies (Studies I–IV).  
In Study VI subjects received single pulse and long-interval paired pulse 
stimulation while being awake as well as during NREM sleep. Neural responses 
were concurrently recorded via EEG. Results demonstrate several very 
interesting differences in TMS-evoked responses between the sleep and awake 
state, but also between the single and paired pulse regime specifically during 
sleep. Both stimulation regimes produced a stronger negative TMS-evoked 
response around 200–400 ms during NREM sleep. But only the second pulse in 
the paired pulse regime was also able to induce a prominent positive TMS-
evoked response specifically in NREM sleep. This slow-wave-like EEG 
potential started around 200 ms after the second TMS pulse and lasted for over 
500 ms. In contrast, the responses to the second pulse in the paired pulse regime 
during wakefulness did not exhibit any differences after 200 ms. 
The results of Study VI indicate that it is indeed possible to induce slow 
brain potential waves reminiscent of sleep slow waves when early visual cortex 
is stimulated by long-interval paired TMS pulses (i.e. when similar timing para-
meters as with visual masking are used). One appealing explanation for this 
result is that the second TMS pulse was able to benefit from the effects of the 
first TMS pulse because it already brought the cortex into a favorable state. 
Thus, the long-interval paired pulse stimulation paradigm may prove to be an 
even more efficient way of inducing slow waves in sleep. Because slow waves 
are associated with several beneficial effects of sleep (see Discussion of Study 
VI for more details) this novel regime may also have therapeutic value for 
sleeping disorders and the accompanying cognitive impairments.  
Although we neither propose to have developed a measure for the state of 
consciousness nor to have found a conclusive way to conciliate the neural 
markers of conscious state with the neural markers of conscious content a few 
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tentative remarks with regard to the previously discussed markers of NCC are 
nevertheless possible. First of all, we were able to replicate the findings 
showing that slow waves are a sign of the unconscious state. Thus, the strong 
positive response to the second TMS pulse can be regarded as a neural marker 
of unconsciousness. Interestingly, this marker starts to arise around 200 ms 
post-stimulus (i.e. the second pulse) which is about the time that content-based 
NCC markers are estimated to onset in the awake state (see Study I–III). The 
first TMS pulses generated a negative EEG potential specifically during sleep 
which also started around 200 ms post-stimulus. Again, one might interpret it 
tentatively as a neural marker of unconsciousness. This sleep-specific negative 
component should not be confused with the visually evoked N200, however, 
because it lacks the topographic specificity on occipito-temporal regions. 
Therefore, the N200 remains a marker of the sensory aspect of consciousness – 
possibly indexing the general process of becoming conscious of any stimulus 
(see Study I for general markers of conscious visual perception). Similarly, 
slow negativity which seems to indicate increased arousal state (Murd et al., 
2010) and has been associated with consciousness (He & Raichle, 2009) may 
constitute a good indicator of wakefulness thus supplementing the above 
described slow positivity during sleep. On the other hand, the absence of a clear 
brain potential in response to the second TMS pulse in the long-interval paired 
pulse protocol could become a marker of (perhaps unreported) consciousness in 
patients with communicative handicaps. This possibility of instrumental 
diagnostics of consciousness of course has to be supported in future studies 
using anesthetized subjects contrasted to un-anesthetized, conscious subjects. 
 
 
 
27 
CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of the present work was to study the neural basis of conscious expe-
rience in general and the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in particular. 
To that end, NCC were operationalized as EEG markers of conscious visual 
perception obtained in the experiments using contrastive analyses. Although 
consciousness is an exceedingly difficult phenomenon to study or even grasp 
conceptually we nevertheless believe that by proceeding with the research step-
by-step one can get closer to the truth of it. The present work has tried to 
contribute to this research effort by following 4 general rationales: 
 
1) More refined experimental paradigms are needed to control for or investigate 
possible NCC-pr/NCC-co. 
Study I was designed to control for stimulus type specific NCC-pr/NCC-co. 
The goal was to find out which markers of NCC are general across stimuli and 
reliable enough within one study despite the pitfalls of the contrastive method. 
N200 and P300 were the two ERP components that satisfied these criteria. 
Nevertheless, both of these components may have also represented general 
NCC-pr/NCC-co that almost always may accompany the NCC proper. Thus, 
Study II was carefully designed and conducted to specifically investigate 
whether P300 may actually index a NCC-co reflecting working memory pro-
cesses independent of consciousness. However, results again identified both 
N200 and also P300 as the markers of NCC. Study III used a novel pre-
stimulus masking paradigm with TMS to investigate whether more global 
network effects could constitute a critical, yet previously unexplored NCC-pr. 
Results did support the hypothesized importance of network connectivity for 
conscious perception and also the role of N200 as a marker of NCC. But they 
also exemplified that identifying markers of NCC is not the same as identifying 
the actual NCC themselves. After all, N200 may have indexed many other 
parallel processes besides the processes constituting NCC or all 3 types of NCC 
may have overlapped during that time. It is impossible to conclude which pro-
cesses were affected exactly. Finally, Study IV sought to investigate the 
specific role of prior knowledge for NCC-pr by concurrently controlling for the 
well-known effect of sensory evidence. Results indeed demonstrated a very 
early effect that was only specific to prior knowledge (not sensory evidence) 
and conscious visual perception (not objective task performance). Thus, Study 
IV demonstrated that NCC-pr may not just be any processes preceding NCC 
proper in time, but may well be directly and specifically related to conscious 
perception.  
 
2) The stimuli used in typical paradigms are too restrictive and artificial. This 
may distort or bias the results and pose an obstacle for revealing the general 
markers of consciousness invariant to the narrow range of stimulus contents. 
If a study employs a restrictive stimulus set then perceptual events become 
inevitably more predictable. Study IV indeed demonstrated that prior know-
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ledge about upcoming stimuli has a direct influence on conscious perception 
and is associated with an early neural effect. Study V showed that at least some 
stimuli can be distinguished on the basis of neural responses to TMS per-
turbation during prolonged perception. This indicates that the neural responses 
and thus also the NCC may possibly be different to some extent for different 
types of stimuli. Note also that the critical results of both Study IV and Study 
V were obtained with realistic complex stimuli which are hypothesized to be 
ideally suited for the visual system. Up to now too many of the NCC studies 
have used very simple stimuli, which may hinder the quest for NCC. Finally, in 
Study I we avoided this confound of predictability and lack of general status of 
markers due to stimulus specificity, both associated with restricted content. This 
was achieved by presenting a heterogeneous stimulus set including many 
complex stimuli such as faces, animals or man-made objects.  
 
3) More attention should be given to the variability in results and how it can be 
explained.  
Variability of results comes in many forms (behavioral as well as neural) and 
has been a constant concern in cognitive research from its very beginnings. 
Oftentimes it is regarded as an annoying (or possibly even dangerous) source of 
noise and should thus be ignored or eliminated, if possible. However, variability 
can also be exploited to conduct more sensitive tests and obtain more meaning-
ful results. In Study I we purposefully introduced variability to the stimulus 
material in order to make perceptual events less predictable and thus overcome 
a known confound in NCC research. In the same study we also tried to estimate 
the variability of NCC markers within one single paradigm. As it turned out, the 
markers of NCC – their occurrence but even more so their onset latency – can 
vary considerably if a contrastive analysis is used. In an effort to explain the 
source of this extensive variability in NCC marker onset latencies we analyzed 
relevant single trial parameters and found out that variability in NCC marker 
onset latencies is best explained by amplitude fluctuations in the condition 
without conscious perception. Therefore, it is possible that stability of evoked 
responses is a hallmark of conscious perception. In Studies III and IV we used 
the relationship between inter-subject variability in behavioral effects and 
neural responses to conduct more sensitive tests for our research questions. In 
Study III this enabled us to find for the first time a neural marker for pre-
stimulus masking with TMS. In Study IV it led to the identification of an early 
neural marker for the specific effect of prior knowledge on conscious visual 
perception. Thus, in both of these studies we tried to overcome the problematic 
contrastive approach by employing an alternative analysis method.  
 
4) The ongoing state of the brain must be taken into account when investigating 
the neural markers of consciousness as a response to natural and artificial 
perturbations of the brain. 
It goes without saying that perception and behavior are not solely based on 
the activity of isolated brain areas performing specific tasks. These areas also 
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form intricate networks and only the concentrated ongoing effort of these 
networks is able to maintain our stable perception of the world around us. It is 
unlikely that we will understand the NCC without first understanding the effects 
of such relevant network activity. For example, Study III was designed to 
investigate whether pre-stimulus TMS masking is also possible through 
stimulation of not the early visual cortex but instead a distant frontal area of the 
brain. If yes, it would support the assumption that the ongoing state of a larger 
task-related network is critical for perception. And indeed, results demonstrated 
a clear masking effect with frontal TMS. Study V approached the process of 
conscious perception in a more unconventional way. The goal was to find out 
whether neural responses to TMS perturbation differ depending on which kind 
of information the visual system holds during prolonged conscious perception. 
As the results were confirmatory at least for some types of stimuli it may be 
well worth studying in the future whether the markers of NCC are more easily 
identifiable for ongoing perceptual states. It will also be important to understand 
how the process of ongoing perception relates to the much more studied process 
of transient perception. Finally, Study VI investigated the neural markers of 
sleep versus wakefulness (i.e. different states of consciousness not contents of 
consciousness). Results demonstrate that it is possible to induce slow waves (a 
well-known marker for the loss of consciousness during sleep) also from the 
early visual cortex if a long-interval paired pulse TMS regime is employed. 
Specifically the second pulse produced a response indicative of the state of 
(un)consciousness. Interestingly, this massive positive response started around 
the same time (ca. 200 ms post-stimulus) as the markers for conscious visual 
perception are estimated to arise (see Study I). Thus, the results indicate that 
the markers for states of consciousness may be related to the markers for con-
tents of consciousness in meaningful and informative ways. 
 
Not surprisingly, the presently discussed work in accordance with the 4 ratio-
nales has not conclusively solved all the problems facing consciousness 
research today. The phenomenon of consciousness is just too complex and 
challenging to be completely understood in the near future by anyone. My hope 
is simply that these studies will be as useful to our fellow researchers as they 
have been for us in furthering our understanding of the topic and its critical 
points. Thus, without further reservations, we remain most curiously expectant 
of all new advancements toward a better understanding of the neural correlates 
of consciousness and their markers. 
 
 
30 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
“We asked”, “we investigated”, “we concluded” – I deliberately chose this style 
of writing for my thesis in acknowledgement of the fact that research is first and 
foremost a profoundly collaborative undertaking. I am deeply thankful to all my 
colleagues not just for helping me in the practical matters of conducting a study, 
but also for presenting me with exciting new ideas and for inspiring me to keep 
learning.  
I thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Talis Bachmann for his kindness and sup-
port. Despite his many duties he always found time for me should I need it. 
Thank You for trusting me to figure out my own solutions as well – even if it 
sometimes took longer than anticipated. 
I would not have come far these past four years without the constant support 
and effort of my closest colleague and dear friend Dr. Jaan Aru. He was my 
rock especially in the early phases of my PhD.  
Dr. Lucia Melloni supervised me the first time already for my Master’s 
thesis and has remained an important role model ever since. Thank You for 
advising and guiding me. 
I thank Dr. Raul Vicente for all his help over the years and hope to keep 
learning from him in the future.  
There is nothing better than to be part of a research group where people 
support and value each other. Thank You, Dr. Carolina Murd, Dr. Inga Karton, 
Kadi Tulver, Marit Martin and Mihkel Stamm – I could not wish for more 
amazing coworkers.  
During my PhD I was also fortunate to be a part of an inspiring interdiscipli-
nary doctoral school. For that I would like to thank Katre Sakala and Kristel 
Vits who organized the most awesome and productive events.  
But whether in my work or in other parts of life – no one has supported me 
more than my mom, Dr. Siret Rutiku. I love and thank You more than words 
can express! 
Finally, I would also like to thank my dear friends Mari Aru and Jürgen 
Strandberg for making me laugh and enjoy life outside the lab.  
 
This research was supported by grants from the Estonian Scientific Competency 
Council (SF0180027s12) and the Estonian Research Agency (IUT20-40 / 
TSHPH14140I and IUT40-30). 
 
31 
REFERENCES 
Amzica, F., & Steriade, M. (1995). Disconnection of intracortical synaptic linkages 
disrupts synchronization of a slow oscillation. The Journal of Neuroscience, 15(6), 
4658–4677. 
Arieli, A., Sterkin, A., Grinvald, A., & Aertsen, A. (1996). Dynamics of ongoing acti-
vity: explanation of the large variability in evoked cortical responses. Science, 
273(5283), 1868–1871. 
Aru, J., Axmacher, N., Do Lam, A. T., Fell, J., Elger, C. E., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. 
(2012a). Local category-specific gamma band responses in the visual cortex do not 
reflect conscious perception. The Journal of Neuroscience, 32(43), 14909–14914. 
Aru, J., & Bachmann, T. (2015). Still wanted – the mechanisms of consciousness! 
Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 5. 
Aru, J., Bachmann, T., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. (2012b). Distilling the neural corre-
lates of consciousness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(2), 737–746. 
Aru, J., Bachmann, T., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. (2015). On why the unconscious pre-
requisites and consequences of consciousness might derail us from unraveling the 
neural correlates of consciousness. In S.M. Miller (Ed.), The Constitution of Pheno-
menal Consciousness. Toward a Science and Theory. (pp. 205–225). Amsterdam/ 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Baars, B.J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Bachmann, T. (1994). Psychophysiology of visual masking: the fine structure of 
conscious experience. Commack (N.Y.): Nova. 
Bachmann, T. (2000). Microgenetic approach to the conscious mind. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
Bachmann, T. (2006). Microgenesis of perception: conceptual, psychophysical, and 
neurobiological aspects. In H. Öğmen, & B.G. Breitmeyer (Eds.), The first half 
second: The microgenesis and temporal dynamics of unconscious and conscious 
visual processes. (pp. 11–33). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bachmann, T. (2009). Finding ERP-signatures of target awareness: Puzzle persists 
because of experimental co-variation of the objective and subjective variables. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 18(3), 804–808. 
Bachmann, T. (2011). Attention as a process of selection, perception as a process of 
representation, and phenomenal experience as the resulting process of perception 
being modulated by a dedicated consciousness mechanism. Frontiers in Psychology, 
2, 387. 
Bachmann, T. (2013). On the all-or-none rule of conscious perception. Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience, 7, 387. 
Bachmann, T. (2015). On the brain-imaging markers of neural correlates of conscious-
ness. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 868. 
Bachmann, T., & Hudetz, A. G. (2014). It is time to combine the two main traditions in 
the research on the neural correlates of consciousness: C = L × D. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5, 940. 
Bachmann, T., & Murd, C. (2010). Covert spatial attention in search for the location of 
a color-afterimage patch speeds up its decay from awareness: Introducing a method 
useful for the study of neural correlates of visual awareness. Vision Research, 
50(11), 1048–1053. 
32 
Berkes, P., Orbán, G., Lengyel, M., & Fiser, J. (2011). Spontaneous cortical activity 
reveals hallmarks of an optimal internal model of the environment. Science, 331, 
83–87. 
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 18, 227–287. 
Corthout, E., Uttl, B., Walsh, V., Hallett, M., & Cowey, A. (1999a). Timing of activity 
in early visual cortex as revealed by transcranial magnetic stimulation. NeuroReport, 
10, 2631–2634.  
Corthout, E., Uttl, B., Ziemann, U., Cowey, A., & Hallett, M. (1999b). Two periods of 
processing in the (circum)striate visual cortex as revealed by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation. Neuropsychologia, 37, 137–145. 
Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1990). Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. 
Seminars in the neurosciences, 2, 263–275. 
Del Cul, A., Baillet, S., & Dehaene, S. (2007). Brain dynamics underlying the nonlinear 
threshold for access to consciousness. PLoS Biology, 5(10), e260. 
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches to 
conscious processing. Neuron, 70, 200–227. 
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006). Conscious, 
preconscious, and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 10(5), 204–211. 
Dehaene, S., Charles, L., King, J.R., & Marti, S. (2014). Toward a computational theory 
of conscious processing. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 25, 76–84. 
Devor, A., Bandettini, P.A., Boas, D.A., Bower, J.M., Buxton, R.B., Cohen, L.B., Dale, 
A.M., et al. (2013). The challenge of connecting the dots in the B.R.A.I.N. Neuron, 
80(2), 270–274. 
van Dijk, H., Schoffelen, J.M., Oostenveld, R., & Jensen, O. (2008). Prestimulus 
oscillatory activity in the alpha band predicts visual discrimination ability. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 1816–1823. 
Donchin, E. (1981). Surprise!… surprise? Psychophysiology, 18(5), 493–513.  
Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 360(1456), 815–836. 
Godwin, D., Barry, R.L., & Marois, R. (2015). Breakdown of the brain's functional 
network modularity with awareness. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 112(12), 3799–3804. 
de Graaf, T.A., Cornelsen, S., Jacobs, C., & Sack, A.T. (2011a). TMS effects on sub-
jective and objective measures of vision: stimulation intensity and pre- versus post- 
stimulus masking. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(4), 1244–1255. 
de Graaf, T.A., Herring, J., & Sack, A.T. (2011b). A chronometric exploration of high- 
resolution ‘sensitive TMS masking’ effects on subjective and objective measures of 
vision. Experimental Brain Research, 209, 19–27. 
de Graaf, T.A., Hsieh, P.J., & Sack, A.T. (2012). The ‘correlates’ in neural correlates of 
consciousness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36, 191–197. 
Gregory, R.L. (1970). The intelligent eye. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
Grosbras, M.H., & Paus, T. (2003). Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the human 
frontal eye field facilitates visual awareness. European Journal of Neuroscience, 
18(11), 3121–3126. 
He, B.J., & Raichle, M.E. (2009). The fMRI signal, slow cortical potential and con-
sciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(7), 302–309. 
Helmholtz, H. (1867). Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik, Leipzig: Voss.  
33 
Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford University Press. 
Jacobs, C., Goebel, R., & Sack, A.T. (2012). Visual awareness suppression by pre-
stimulus brain stimulation: a neural effect. NeuroImage, 59, 616–624. 
Jacobs, C., de Graaf, T.A., & Sack, A.T. (2014). Two distinct neural mechanisms in 
early visual cortex determine subsequent visual processing. Cortex, 59, 1–11. 
Jones, H.E., Andolina, I.M., Shipp, S.D., Adams, D.L., Cudeiro, J., Salt, T.E., Sillito, 
A.M. (2015). Figure-ground modulation in awake primate thalamus. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112(22), 7085–
7090. 
Kelly, S.P., & O'Connell, R.G. (2013). Internal and external influences on the rate of 
sensory evidence accumulation in the human brain. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
33(50), 19434 –19441. 
Kersten, D., Mamassian, P., & Yuille, A. (2004). Object perception as Bayesian in-
ference. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 271–304. 
Koch, C. (2004). The quest for consciousness. Englewood: Roberts & Co. 
Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. (2007). Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain pro-
cesses. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1), 16–22. 
Koivisto, M., & Revonsuo, A. (2010). Event-related brain potential correlates of visual 
awareness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(6), 922–934. 
Leonardelli, E., Braun, C., Weisz, N., Lithari, C., Occelli, V., & Zampini, M. (2015). 
Prestimulus oscillatory alpha power and connectivity patterns predispose perceptual 
integration of an audio and a tactile stimulus. Human Brain Mapping, 36(9), 3486–
3498. 
Massimini, M., Huber, R., Ferrarelli, F., Hill, S., & Tononi, G. (2004). The sleep slow 
oscillation as a traveling wave. The Journal of Neuroscience, 24(31),  6862–6870. 
Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., Esser, S.K., Riedner, B.A., Huber, R., Murphy, M., et al. 
(2007). Triggering sleep slow waves by transcranial magnetic stimulation. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
104(20), 8496–8501. 
Mayer, A., Schwiedrzik, C. M., Wibral, M., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. (2015). 
Expecting to See a Letter: Alpha Oscillations as Carriers of Top-Down Sensory 
Predictions. Cerebral Cortex, bhv146. 
Melloni, L., Molina, C., Pena, M., Torres, D., Singer, W., & Rodriguez, E. (2007). 
Synchronization of neural activity across cortical areas correlates with conscious 
perception. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27, 2858–2865. 
Melloni, L., Schwiedrzik, C.M., Müller, N., Rodriguez, E., & Singer, W. (2011) Ex-
pectations change the signatures and timing of electrophysiological correlates of 
perceptual awareness. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(4), 1386–1396. 
Melloni, L., & Singer, W. (2010). Distinct characteristics of conscious experience are 
met by large scale neuronal synchronization. In E. Perry, D. Collerton, F.E.N. 
LeBeau, & H. Ashton (Eds.), New Horizons in the Neuroscience of Consciousness. 
(pp. 17–28). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Miller, G., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. (1960). Plans and structure of behavior. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 
Murd, C., Aru, J., Hiio, M., Luiga, I., & Bachmann, T. (2010). Caffeine enhances 
frontal relative negativity of slow brain potentials in a task-free experimental setup. 
Brain Research Bulletin, 82(1–2), 39–45. 
34 
Murd, C., & Bachmann, T. (2011). Spatially localized motion aftereffect disappears 
faster from awareness when selectively attended to according to its direction. Vision 
Research, 51(10), 1157–1162. 
Murphy, M., Riedner, B., Huber, R., Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., & Tononi, G. (2009). 
Source modeling sleep slow waves. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 106, 1608–1613. 
Navajas, J., Ahmadi, M., & Quian Quiroga, R. (2013). Uncovering the mechanisms of 
conscious face perception: a single-trial study of the N170 responses. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 33(4), 1337–1343. 
Nierhaus, T., Forschack, N., Piper, S.K., Holtze, S., Krause, T., Taskin, B., Long, X., et 
al. (2015). Imperceptible somatosensory stimulation alters sensorimotor background 
rhythm and connectivity. The Journal of Neuroscience, 35(15), 5917–5925. 
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Noreika, V., Valli, K., Lahtela, H., & Revonsuo, A. (2009). Early-night serial awakenings 
as a new paradigm for studies on NREM dreaming. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 74(1), 14–18. 
Norman, D.A. (1968). Toward a theory of memory and attention. Psychological Review, 
75, 522–536. 
O'Connell, R.G., Dockree, P.M., & Kelly, S.P. (2012). A supramodal accumulation-to-
bound signal that determines perceptual decisions in humans. Nature Neuroscience, 
15(12), 1729–1735. 
Overgaard, M. (2004). Confounding factors in contrastive analysis. Synthese, 141, 217–
231. 
Pins, D., & ffytche, D. (2003). The neural correlates of conscious vision. Cerebral 
Cortex, 13(5), 461–474. 
Pitts, M.A., Padwal, J., Fennelly, D., Martínez, A., & Hillyard, S.A. (2014a). Gamma 
band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness. 
NeuroImage, 101, 337–350. 
Pitts, M.A., Metzler, S., & Hillyard, S.A. (2014b). Isolating neural correlates of 
conscious perception from neural correlates of reporting one's perception. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 5, 1078.  
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: an integrative theory of P3a and P3b. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 118(10), 2128–2148. 
Polich, J. (2012). Neuropsychology of P300. In S.J. Luck, & E.S. Kappenman (Eds.) 
Oxford Handbook of Event-Related Potential Components (pp. 159–188). New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Railo, H., Revonsuo, A., & Koivisto, M. (2015). Behavioral and electrophysiological 
evidence for fast emergence of visual consciousness. Neuroscience of Conscious-
ness, 2015(1), 1–12. 
Rao, R.P., & Ballard, D.H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional 
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature Neuroscience, 
2(1), 79–87. 
Romei, V., Rihs, T., Brodbeck, V., & Thut, G. (2008). Resting electroencephalogram 
alpha-power over posterior sites indexes baseline visual cortex excitability. 
NeuroReport, 19, 203–208. 
Rounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J.C., Passingham, R.E., & Lau, H. (2010). Theta-
burst transcranial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs metacogni-
tive visual awareness. Cognitive Neuroscience, 1(3), 165–175. 
35 
Sadaghiani, S., Poline, J.B., Kleinschmidt, A., & D'Esposito, M. (2015). Ongoing dyna-
mics in large-scale functional connectivity predict perception. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112(27), 8463–8468. 
Schurger, A., Sarigiannidis, I., Naccache, L., Sitt, J.D., & Dehaene, S. (2015). Cortical 
activity is more stable when sensory stimuli are consciously perceived. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112(16), 
E2083–E2092. 
Searle, J.R. (1997). The mystery of consciousness. New York: The New York Review of 
Books. 
Shafto, J.P., & Pitts, M.A. (2015). Neural signatures of conscious face perception in an 
inattentional blindness paradigm. The Journal of Neuroscience, 35(31), 10940–
10948. 
Siclari, F., LaRocque, J.J., Postle, B.R., & Tononi, G. (2013). Assessing sleep con-
sciousness within subjects using a serial awakening paradigm. Frontiers in Psycho-
logy, 4, 542. 
Solovey, G., Alonso, L.M., Yanagawa, T., Fujii, N., Magnasco, M.O., Cecchi, G.A., & 
Proekt, A. (2015). Loss of consciousness is associated with stabilization of cortical 
activity. The Journal of Neuroscience, 35(30), 10866–10877. 
Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2008). The neural correlates of consciousness: an update. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 1124, 239–261. 
Verleger, R., Japkowski, P., & Wascher, E. (2005). Evidence for an integrative role of 
P3b in linking reaction to perception. Journal of Psychophysiology, 19, 165–181. 
Verleger, R., Metzner, M.F., Ouyang, G., Śmigasiewicz, K., & Zhou, C. (2014). Testing 
the stimulus-to-response bridging function of the oddball-P3 by delayed response 
signals and residue iteration decomposition (RIDE). NeuroImage, 100, 271–280. 
Weisz, N., Wühle, A., Monittola, G., Demarchi, G., Frey, J., Popov, T., & Braun, C. 
(2014). Prestimulus oscillatory power and connectivity patterns predispose con-
scious somatosensory perception. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America, 111(4), E417-E425. 
Wyart, V., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2008). Neural dissociation between visual awareness 
and spatial attention. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28(10), 2667–2679. 
 
36 
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Teadvuse neuronaalsete korrelaatide  
uurimismetoodika edasiarendusi 
Tänapäeval on üldiselt aktsepteeritud, et teadvuse neuronaalsete alustalade 
mõistmiseks on esimese sammuna tarvis täpsemalt määratleda ja tundma õppida 
teadvuse neuronaalseid korrelaate – neid ajuprotsesse, mis on minimaalselt 
tarvilikud mingi kindla teadvuselamuse jaoks (Koch, 2004). Kuna nägemismeel 
on meie jaoks kõige tähtsam tajumodaalsus, mida on põhjalikult uuritud nii 
eksperimentaalpsühholoogide kui ka neurobioloogide poolt, on valdav enamus 
senistest käesoleva uurimisvaldkonna teadustöödest keskendunud visuaalsete 
teadvuselamuste neuronaalsetele korrelaatidele. Ka käesolev töö on just nimelt 
suunatud visuaalse teadvustamisega seonduvate protsesside ning nende ajukuva 
abil registreeritavate markerite uurimisele. 
Hoolimata sellest, et vastavat uurimistööd on tehtud palju, on tulemused 
olnud väga erinevad. Vahel leitakse, et millegi teadvustamine on pigem hiline 
protsess, mis seondub frontoparietaalse võrgustiku aktiivsusega (nt Sergent jt., 
2005; Del Cul jt., 2007), kuid teiste uuringute andmetel on teadvuse korrelaadid 
pigem varajased ja ilmnevad sensoorsetes piirkondades (nt Pins & Ffytche, 
2003). Viimasel ajal toonitatakse eelkõige nende kahe äärmuse – 100 ja 300 
millisekundi – vahel oleva latentsiajaga korrelaatide olulisust (Koivisto & 
Revonsuo, 2010). Üks põhjus, miks erinevate tööde tulemused nii vastandlikud 
võivad olla, on seotud probleemidega kontrastiivanalüüsi kasutamisel. Kontras-
tiivanalüüs on teadvuse korrelaatide tuvastamise enim levinud meetod. Selle 
käigus võrreldakse teadvustamise taganud katsekordadel mõõdetud ajutegevust 
teadvustamist mitte taganud katsekordade ajutegevusega lootuses erinevusena 
leida markerid just nimelt nendele protsessidele, mis otseselt seonduvad 
teadvuselamusega. Samas ei pruugi aga teadvustamise protsessid olla ilmtingi-
mata ainukeseks erinevuseks nende kahe tingimuse vahel. Erinevusena võivad 
välja tulla ka protsessid, mis süstemaatiliselt eelnevad teadvuse korrelaatideks 
olevatele protsessidele või neile järgnevad, kuid sealjuures ise otseselt tead-
vustamise protsessid ei ole (Overgaard, 2004; Bachmann, 2009; Aru et al., 
2012b; de Graaf et al., 2012). 
Kuigi kontrastiivanalüüsiga kaasnev metodoloogiline probleem on nüüdseks 
juba mitu aastat teada, pole sellele veel veenvat lahendust leitud (Aru et al., 
2015). Et sellegipoolest liikuda teadvuse korrelaatide ning nende markerite pa-
rema mõistmise suunas, on tarvis jätkata kontrastiivanalüüsi alternatiivide 
otsinguid kui ka üritada kontrastiivanalüüsiga kaasnevaid ohte vältida. Need 
eesmärgid on käesolevas töös täide viidud nelja üldist põhimõtet järgides: 
 
1) Teadvuse korrelaatide tuvastamiseks on tarvis kasutada senisest rafineeritu-
maid katseparadigmasid, vältimaks või uurimaks teadvusega süstemaatiliselt 
kaasnevaid teisi protsesse. 
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Uurimus I eesmärgiks oli vältida erinevate stiimulitüüpidega kaasnevaid 
kitsalt spetsiifilisi protsesse ja leida sellised visuaalse teadvustamise markerid, 
mis on üldomased erinevatele stiimulitele ning on hoolimata kontrastiivanalüüsi 
probleemist usaldusväärsed ühe katseparadigma siseselt. Elektroentsefalo-
graafia (EEG) sündmuspotentsiaalide komponendid N200 ja P300 vastasid 
nimetatud tingimustele. Siiski on aga võimalik, et üks nendest markeritest või 
isegi mõlemad on hoopis seotud teadvustamisele eelnevate või sellele järgne-
vate üldiste protsessidega, mis hoolimata stiimulitüübist alati teadvusega kaas-
nevad, olemata iseenesest teadvustamisprotsessid. Uurimus II üritas seega 
hoolikalt planeeritud ning läbiviidud katseparadigma kaudu testida, kas P300 
võib hoopiski tähistada teadvustamisele järgnevaid töömälu protsesse. Tulemu-
sed näitasid aga taas, et nii N200 kui ka P300 on mõlemad visuaalse 
teadvustamise markerid.  
Uurimuses III rakendati uudset stiimulieelse transkraniaalse magnetstimu-
latsiooniga (TMS-iga) maskeerimise paradigmat eesmärgiga selgitada, kas 
globaalsete neurovõrgustike käimasolev seisund, mida moduleeritakse teadvus-
tamise objektiks oleva stimuli suhtes mittespetsiifiliselt kujutab endast olulist 
teadvustamisele eelnevat protsessi. Tulemused tõepoolest toetasid seda oletust 
ning taaskord kinnitasid N200 komponendi olulisust visuaalse teadvustamise 
markerina.  
Uurimus IV eesmärgiks oli määratleda stiimulikohaste eelteadmiste spetsii-
filine roll teadvustamise protsessi käigus, kontrollides samas stiimulite objek-
tiivse nähtavuse teadaolevat kaasmuutuvat mõju. Tulemused näitasid, et sellised 
eelteadmised on seotud väga varajase neuronaalse efektiga ning see efekt on 
spetsiifiline just nimelt teadvustatud taju jaoks.  
 
2) Eelnevates töödes on tihti kasutatud liiga piiratud ulatusega ning kunstlikke 
stiimuleid. See võib tulemusi kallutada ning takistada stiimulite sisust sõltu-
matute üldiste teadvuse korrelaatide tuvastamist. 
Kui katses kasutatakse ainult vähest hulka erinevaid stiimuleid, siis muu-
tuvad need stiimulid suurel määral ettearvatavaks. Uurimus IV tulemused kin-
nitasid, et eelteadmised stiimulite kohta mõjutavad otseselt nende stiimulite 
teadvustamist ning omavad väga varajast neuronaalset efekti. Uurimus V 
tulemused näitasid, et vähemalt osasid loomulikku keskkonda iseloomustavaid 
stiimuleid pidevalt vaadates on võimalik neid stiimuleid eristada TMS per-
turbatsioonidega kaasnevate neuronaalsete vastuste põhjal. Seega võib oletada, 
et ka teadvuse neurokorrelaadid võivad teatud määral varieeruda erinevate 
stiimulite lõikes. Siinkohal on tähtis lisada, et nii Uurimus IV kui ka Uurimus 
V kriitilised tulemused ilmnesid komplekssete realistike stiimulite korral. 
Arvatavasti on sellised stiimulid visuaalse süsteemi jaoks optimaalsed võrreldes 
lihtsate kunstlike stiimulitega (Kersten jt., 2004). Lähtuvalt eelmainitud põhi-
mõtetest ja kooskõlas teiste meie tulemustega välditi Uurimus I raames piiratud 
ulatusega ning kunstlike stiimulitega kaasnevate kaasmuutuvate ning ülemäära 
spetsiifiliste faktorite ebasoovitavaid mõjusid. Selleks esitati katseisikutele 
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suurel hulgal erinevaid stiimuleid, mis hõlmasid ka komplekssemaid figuure 
nagu näiteks näod, loomad ning tööriistad. 
 
3) Rohkem tähelepanu tuleks pöörata tulemuste variatiivsusele ning küsimusele 
sellest, kuidas seda variatiivsust seletada. 
Kõikide katsete tulemused varieeruvad nii käitumuslikul kui ka neuronaalsel 
tasemel. Seda variatiivsust saab ära kasutada, et läbi viia tundlikumaid teste 
ning seekaudu saada tähendusrikkamaid tulemusi. 
Uurimuses I kasutati meelega ulatuslikult varieeruvaid stiimuleid, et muuta 
neid vähem etteaimatavaks ja vähem kitsalt-spetsiifiliseks. Samas uuringus seati 
eesmärgiks ka hinnata, kui variatiivsed võivad teadvuse neurokorrelaatide 
markerid olla ühe katse siseselt. Tulemused näitasid, et markerid – nii nende 
esinemine, aga eelkõige nende algusaeg – olid märkimisväärselt variatiivsed. 
Seda variatiivsust seletas kõige paremini EEG potentsiaalide amplituudi 
kõikumine tingimustes, kus sihtstiimulit ei teadvustatud. Seega võib oletada, et 
teadvustamise iseloomulik tunnus on neuronaalse aktiivsuse stabiilsus vastusena 
stimulatsioonile.  
Uurimustes III ja IV võeti vaatluse alla seosed käitumusliku ning neuro-
naalse variatiivsuse vahel, et tundlikumalt käsitleda töö keskseid uurimusküsi-
musi. Urimuses III võimaldas selline lähenemine leida seni mitteteadaolevad ja 
üldistatud andmetes peitu jäävad teadvuse neuronaalsed korrelaadid stiimu-
lieelse TMS-iga maskeerimise paradigmas. Uurimuses IV lubas see lähene-
mine tuvastada eelteadmisega seostuva varajase neuronaalse efekti teadvus-
tamisele. Seega leiti mõlemas uuringus hea alternatiiv problemaatilisele tradit-
sioonilisele kontrastiivanalüüsile.  
 
4) Kui uuritakse teadvuse korrelaatide markereid seoses loomulike ning kunst-
like aju perturbatsioonidega peab arvesse võtma aju käimasolevat seisundit. 
Ilmselgelt ei põhine taju ning käitumine ainult üksikute isoleeritud aju-
keskuste aktiivsusel. Need keskused moodustavad keerulisi võrgustikke ja 
ainult nende võrgustike pidevalt jätkuv koostöö tagab stabiilse taju meid 
ümbritsevast maailmast. Tõenäoliselt ei suuda me mõista teadvuse korrelaate 
enne kui hakkame mõistma globaalsete võrgustike aktiivsuse efekte. Seonduvalt 
sellega näitasid Uurimus III tulemused, et teadvustamise stiimulieelne TMS-
iga maskeerimine pole mitte ainult võimalik esmase visuaalse korteksi stimu-
leerimise kaudu, vaid ilmneb ka siis, kui TMS on suunatud aju frontaalsetele 
aladele. Seega viitavad tulemused tõsiasjale, et teadvustamise jaoks on oluline 
ka globaalsema võrgustiku parajasti käimasolev seisund.  
Uurimus V lähenes visuaalsete teadvuselamuste uurimisele ebatüüpilise 
nurga alt. Eesmärk oli uurida, kas neuronaalne vastukaja TMS perturbatsioonile 
erineb olenevalt sellest, millist informatsiooni visuaalne süsteem parasjagu 
töötluses hoiab. Kuna tulemused näitasid, et käimasoleva kestvalt kogetava taju 
sisud on tõepoolest teatud juhtudel TMS perturbatsiooni abil EEG sündmus-
potentsiaalide (ERP) markerites eristatavad, tasub tulevikus täpsemalt uurida, 
kas teadvuse korrelaadid võiksid olla hõlpsamini tuvastatavad pidevalt kestvate 
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tajusisude jaoks. Lisaks tuleks selgitada, kuidas pidevalt kestvate tajude neuro-
naalsed korrelaadid suhestuvad transientsete stiimulite teadvustamise korre-
laatidega.  
Uurimus VI keskendus unenägudevaba unega kaasnevate ja virgeolekuga 
kaasnevate ajuprotsesside neuronaalsete markerite võrdlevale uurimisele (uuriti 
teadvusseisundeid, mitte teadvuse sisu). Tulemused näitasid, et aeglaseid ERP 
laineid, mis on uneajale iseloomuliku teadvusetuse hästi tuntud markerid, on 
võimalik TMS-i abil esile kutsuda ka esmase visuaalse korteksi stimuleerimi-
sega juhul kui kasutada kahte TMS impulssi, mis esitatakse 100 ms pikkuse 
ajavahega. Huvitaval kombel algas aeglasi laineid tähistav tugev positiivne 
EEG potentsiaal umbes samal ajal (200 ms pärast viimast TMS impulssi) kui 
tavaliselt ilmuvad visuaalse teadvustamise markerid (vaata nt Uurimus I). 
Seega viitavad tulemused sellele, et teadvusseisundite markerid ja teadvuse sisu 
markerid ei pruugi olla eraldiseisvad nähtused, vaid näikse olevat omavahel 
seotud tähendusrikkal moel. Oluline Uurimuse VI tulemus näitas, et teadvusel 
virgeolekus inimese aju ei vasta teisele TMS impulsile märkimisväärsel määral 
samas kui uneseisundis kutsub teine impulss esile suureamplituudsed aeglased 
lained. Selles tulemuses peitub potentsiaal teadvusseisundi diagnostika meeto-
dite väljaarendamiseks neuroloogiakliinikus. 
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